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Abstract Some of the strategies which have been put forward in order to deal with the
inconsistency between quantum mechanics and special relativity are examined. The EPR
correlations are discussed as a simple example of quantum mechanical macroscopic effects
with spacelike separation from their causes. It is shown that they can be used to convey
information, whose reliability can be estimated by means of Bayes’ theorem. Some of the
current reasons advanced to deny that quantum mechanics contradicts special relativity are
refuted, and an historical perspective is provided on the issue.
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“[Einstein] behaves now with Bohr exactly as the supporters of absolute simul-
taneity behaved with him.”
P. Ehrenfest, 3 November 1927
For me this is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently essential
conflict between any sharp formulation and fundamental relativity.
J. Bell, 1984∗
1 Introduction
An important feature of the theoretical landscape in physics during the last ninety years
is that the two main foundational theories, relativity and quantum mechanics, at least
in their standard interpretations, contradict each other. Basically, this is not even a
very subtle remark, since the Schro¨dinger equation, one of the cornerstones of quantum
mechanics, is patently not Poincare´ invariant. It would have been quite surprising if
researchers had never come across experimental settings where quantum mechanics is
at variance with special relativity, and completely unrealistic that they had not become
aware rather soon of the inconsistency issue. However, discussions on the difficulty of
combining relativity and quantum mechanics have often taken the form (and still they
frequently do) of a search for a theory of quantum gravity, which focus on a theoretically
much more ambitious target (that is, some kind of fusion between quantum mechanics
and general relativity).1
In fact the basic issue was recognized and pointed out, authoritatively, around 1930.2
To cite an early explicit statement, in his celebrated treatise first published in German
in 1932, von Neumann stressed what seemed to him:
[...] an essential weakness which is, in fact, the chief weakness of quantum mechan-
ics: its non-relativistic character, which distinguishes the time t from the three
space coordinates x, y, z , and presupposes an objective simultaneity concept.3
∗Ehrenfest: [19], p. 416 (“Er [Einstein] verhaelt sich nun exact gegen Bohr wie die vertheidiger der
absoluten Gleichzeitigkeit sich gegen ihn verhielten”); Bell: [8], p.172.
1The quantum gravity program is still far from having achieved a consensus: “Despite intensive
efforts to create a quantum theory of gravity, the goal is still illusive. We are no closer than 30 years
ago as more and serious difficulties have developed. Many imaginative theories have been proposed;
none is yet successful and some have met remarkable defeat.” [37]
2Contrary to what Popper wrote half a century later: “It cannot be sufficiently stressed that, apart
from Einstein in his Dialectica article, nobody before Bell suspected that quantum mechanics itself
(and not perhaps only the Copenhagen interpretation) clashed with locality, and therefore with special
relativity” ([61], p. 20n28).
3Italics added; the original 1932 text reads: “[...] eine wesentliche Schwa¨che, ja die Hauptscha¨che,
der Quantenmechanik [...]: ihren unrelativistischen, die Zeit t vor den 3 ra¨umlichen Koordinaten x, y, z ,
auszeichnenden, und einen objectiven Gleichzeitigkeitsbegriff voraussetzenden Charackter” (p. 188 of
[70]). The quotation in the main text is from the American edition of 1955, revised by the author –
[71], p. 354.
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In 1936 Einstein wrote, in the same spirit ([30], p. 351, italics added):
In the Schro¨dinger equation, absolute time, and also the potential energy, play
a decisive role, while these two concepts have been recognized by the theory of
relativity as inadmissible in principle.
With reference to Einstein’s 1905 electrodynamics paper [27], special relativity has been
commonly linked with the demise of both aether and absolute synchrony. Thus von
Neumann’s and Einstein’s statements imply that either quantum mechanics or special
relativity should be modified, if we wish to combine them coherently. Alternatively, one
might choose to confine each theory within a certain experimental domain. This is in
itself a legitimate approach to the management of inconsistencies in physics, although
in this case the strategy of ‘regionalizing’ theories runs against the unificationist pro-
gramme that has been, at least at the foundational level, one of the driving forces in
the development of modern physics. As is well known, the real trouble in the quantum
mechanics versus special relativity issue is that it seems hopeless to draw consistently
a neat general divide between their experimental domains.
While the general considerations sketched above are enough to conclude that an
inconsistency is lurking at the core of contemporary physics, the most famous and
debated example of an argument providing a specific example – insofar as it derives from
quantum mechanics the existence of superluminal causal influences – is that published
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 (the EPR paper, [31]). One of the reasons
this argument deserves the special attention it has increasingly, though by no means
unanimously,4 received in the last half-century, is that it does not hinge on a comparison
of what is observed in relatively moving inertial frames, or on ‘relativistic’ speeds of
either particles or apparatuses, since the whole stage may be thought of as set in what
Einstein in [27] called a “stationary system” (ruhende System). Therefore it is hard to
conceive how a ‘relativistic upgrading’ of quantum mechanics might even come close to
solving the difficulty. One option would have been to wait until what was formerly an
imaginary experiment transformed into a real world experiment. In fact an important
amount of work in the foundations of quantum mechanics has gone into designing and
performing experiments mimicking the EPR setting. While the experimental issue
cannot yet be considered as closed [63, 39, 74, 75, 2], there are still many authors,
as we shall see, supporting unwarranted or mistaken opinions on what should by now
be considered as settled logical issues. However, it is necessary to warn the reader that
the controversy on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is still very much open,
and even what can be held as ‘orthodoxy’ is far from unambiguous.5 Since the very
same claim may be treated by some authors as ‘well-known’ and by others as ‘outright
wrong’, I have abounded in explicit quotations, and tried to be as clear as possible on
the assumptions of my arguments.
The aim of the present paper, which relates to a remark made in [47] (§9.3), is mainly
to clarify the logical structure of the problem at its basic level, and to discuss and crit-
4For instance, Pais in his famous 1982 Einstein biography severely downplayed its importance,
revealing a remarkable bias in his historical judgment: “The conclusion [of the EPR paper] has not
affected subsequent developments in physics, and it is doubtful that it ever will” ([54], p. 456).
5As Steven Weinberg appropriately remarked in 2017: “It is a bad sign that those physicists today
who are most comfortable with quantum mechanics do not agree with one another about what it all
means” [72]. This is also clear from comparing the published comments by other physicists [73].
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icize some of the strategies which have been adopted to minimize, extenuate, or even
deny, the clash between quantum mechanics and special relativity, in fact since the very
first years of their co-existence.6 I show how the logical conflict between the two theories
focused from the beginning on the issue of superluminal action (or influence), and that
Einstein’s concern with quantum mechanics has been largely misunderstood by both
historians and commentators (§2). After briefly dealing with the distinction between
causal influence and signal, and between signal and information transfer (or commu-
nication), the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations are discussed, in Bohm’s
reformulation, as a simple example of quantum mechanical nonlocal causality (i.e. ef-
fects with spacelike separation from their causes) (§3). It is emphasized that, although
they cannot be used as signals, they can be used to transfer information (whose content
is knowable but not decided by the sender) and therewith to achieve practical purposes
(§4). Among the latter, one is to assign probabilities to the occurrence of some past
events prior to receiving conventional reports about them (§6). The conventionalist view
of simultaneity in special relativity, which has been endorsed by some authors as a way
to appease the conflict, is briefly discussed and the occurrence of metrical anomalies and
causality reversals is pointed out when non-standard synchronies are adopted (§§7-8). A
popular approach, whose revival is partly due to simultaneity conventionalism, namely
neo-Lorentzian relativity, is examined and a recent experiment based on it is analyzed
(§9). Some of the standard and of the more recent arguments advanced to deny that a
logical conflict between quantum mechanics and special relativity exists are examined
and, on the whole, refuted, the stress being placed on how much these arguments imply
a change in standard special relativity (§10). In the final section Poincare´’s methodolog-
ical attitude toward the newborn theory of relativity is commented and appreciated,
and a parallel with the crisis caused by Michelson’s experiments is briefly introduced.
2 Superluminal action and the Bohr-Einstein de-
bate
It is not as widely known as it deserves to be that Einstein had already put forward,
at the 5th Solvay conference of 1927, an argument in many ways similar to that of the
1935 paper.7 Heisenberg discussed a slightly different version of it in his University
of Chicago lectures of 1929 (published the next year) where he also mentioned, and
rejected, the hypothesis that quantum mechanics might license superluminal signals, at
least in that setting ([38], p. 39; italics added):8
In relation to these considerations, one other idealized experiment (due to Ein-
stein) may be considered. We imagine a photon which is represented by a wave
packet built out of Maxwell waves. [...] It will thus have a certain spatial extension
6For a recent instance: “All in all, the understanding that has grown over the last few years is that
there is no incompatibility, but a distinct tension between relativity and quantum non-locality [...]”
([44], p. 2, italics in the original). For an earlier contrary opinion, with which I concur, see [7], p. 228.
7On the 5th Solvay conference I refer to [3], which is a commented translation, with textual remarks
and supplements, of the (French) proceedings of that conference. Einstein’s contribution to the general
discussion can be found at pp. 486-8; an outline is provided in [21], pp. 244-7, cf. also [22], p. 177.
8Heisenberg’s treatment was criticized by Karl Popper in 1934 from the viewpoint of what is now
called the ‘statistical’ or ‘ensemble’ interpretation of quantum mechanics ([60], pp. 231-2).
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and also a certain range of frequency. By reflection at a semi-transparent mirror,
it is possible to decompose it into two parts, a reflected and a transmitted packet.
There is then a definite probability for finding the photon either in one part or in
the other part of the divided wave packet. After a sufficient time the two parts
will be separated by any distance desired; now if an experiment yields the result
that the photon is, say, in the reflected part of the packet, then the probability
of finding the photon in the other part of the packet immediately becomes zero.
The experiment at the position of the reflected packet thus exerts a kind of action
(reduction of the wave packet) at the distant point occupied by the transmitted
packet, and one sees that this action is propagated with a velocity greater than
that of light.
As far as the issue of superluminal influences is involved, this imaginary experiment is
morally identical to that presented in the EPR paper five years later.9 This issue was
openly recognized by Dirac, who during the general discussion at the Solvay conference
stated: “At present the general theory of the wave function in many-dimensional space
necessarily involves the abandonment of relativity” ([3], p. 491, italics added). It is
curious that Ehrenfest, in giving in a letter a colourful and enthusiastic account of the
conference,10 compared Einstein resisting Bohr’s complementarity to critics of special
relativity. It is unclear whether he realized that a major stumbling block of Einstein’s as
regards acceptance of quantum mechanics in its soon-to-become orthodox interpretation
was that it was silently restoring superluminal causality and absolute simultaneity.
In the wide (and still fast-growing) literature on conceptual and historical issues of
quantum mechanics, the Bohr’s and Einstein’s debate at the 5th Solvay conference is
usually described in confrontational terms, and its outcome as Bohr’s triumph.11. It
is an anti-climax to see that Bohr’s reply to Einstein’s proto-EPR argument lamely
started with the following statement: “I feel myself in a very difficult position because I
don’t understand what precisely is the point which Einstein wants to [make]. No doubt
it is my fault.”
All things considered, it is clear from studying with some care the historical doc-
uments that a major concern in Einstein’s criticism of the orthodox interpretation of
quantum mechanics was at the time, and was to remain in the following years, not so
much its indeterminism as its basic conflict with special relativity (indeed, it would have
been exceedingly strange if Einstein had failed either to notice it or to be bothered by
it!). Embedded in a more or less naive view of how scientific controversies arise and
develop, the highly quotable Einsteinian quip “God does not play dice” has by and large
misled for decades historians and popularizers – and their readers, including scientists
(cf. [12], pp. 143-4).
Einstein referred to quantum mechanics making “use of telepathic means” in a letter
to C. Lanczos in 1942 ([54], p. 440), and the same charge comes up also in the anecdotal
9In fact it may be reformulated in strictly ‘EPR’ terms (cf. [3], pp. 195-6).
10Cf. inscription of this paper.
11For instance in a biographical book co-authored by one of Einstein’s collaborators and by Einstein’s
secretary: “Refining their concepts in the heat of the battle, [Bohr and his allies] defeated the objections
of Einstein one by one, and Einstein, for all his ingenuity, had to retreat.” ([40], p. 190). Most recently,
here is how the issue is recapitulated by one of the main contributors to the experimental renaissance of
the ‘EPR paradox’: “At the Solvay conference of 1927, however, Bohr refuted all of Einstein’s attacks,
making use of ingenious ‘gedankenexperiments’ bearing on a single quantum particle” [2]
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quirky ending of the section of his replies in Schilpp’s book (published in 1949) devoted
to the quantum controversy ([65], p. 683):
I close these expositions, which have grown rather lengthy, concerning the inter-
pretation of quantum theory with the reproduction of a brief conversation which
I had with an important theoretical physicist. He: “I am inclined to believe in
telepathy”. I: “This has probably more to do with physics than with psychology”.
He: “Yes”.
This apparently incongruous exchange is clarified by comparing it with two letters
Einstein wrote in 1946 about parapsychology ([33], pp. 150-7). In answering on May
13 a query from Jan Eherenwald, a British psychoanalyst, he explained as follows his
reluctance to accept the evidence for extra-sensory perception:
I regard it as very strange that the spatial distance between (telepathic) subjects
has no relevance to the success of the statistical experiments. This suggests to
me a very strong indication that a nonrecognized source of systematic errors may
have been involved.
And in a second letter to the same correspondent, on July 8, he insisted on the same
concept (italics added):
But I find suspicious that ‘clairvoyance’ [tests] yield the same probabilities as
‘telepathy’, and that the distance of the subject from the cards or from the ‘sender’
has no influence on the result. This is, a priori, improbable to the highest degree,
consequently the result is doubtful.
It is on this background that has to be read the famous passage in a letter to Max Born
written less than a year later (March 3, 1947), where Einstein said that he could not
believe in the “spooky action at a distance” (spukhafte Fernwirkung) countenanced by
quantum mechanics ([20], p. 155):
I cannot seriously believe in it [the “statistical approach”] because the theory
cannot be reconciled with the idea that physics should represent a reality in time
and space, free from spooky actions at a distance.
In other words, Einstein thought that quantum mechanics, in its standard interpre-
tation, was to be rejected on grounds similar to those commonly invoked (then as now)
to discredit parapsychological investigations on telepathy, that is, telepathy’s incompat-
ibility with the limit fixed by special relativity to the speed of causal influence. This
issue was almost completely12 ignored by Bohr – not only in the Solvay conference’s
proceedings, but also in his replies to the EPR paper [16] and to Einstein’s Dialectica
paper [29], and even in his famous recollections of his discussions with Einstein on the
12The only partial exception will be cited in the next section. The closest we come in the Solvay con-
ference proceedings is where Bohr states in general terms: “The whole foundation for causal spacetime
description is taken away by quantum theory, for it is based on assumption of observations without
interference.” ([3], p. 489)
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foundations of quantum mechanics [18]. Indeed, in the second and fourth of these con-
tributions he rather tried to draw the attention to “the great lesson derived from general
relativity theory” and the supposedly “striking analogies” between the approaches that
had led Einstein to special, and even general, relativity, and himself to “complemen-
tarity”. However one may judge these parallels (which seem to me far-fetched and
somewhat disingenuous),13 there is no doubt that special relativity had far more to fear
from quantum mechanics than the disputable methodological affinities with the latter
theory could be expected to enhance its standing.
It appears that, on the whole, the community of orthodox quantum theorists, in-
cluding some of its main representatives, refused to lay any emphasis on the fact that
quantum mechanics was incompatible with relativity, and tended rather to suggest or
even to state that Einstein’s perplexities arose from his loyalty to an old-fashioned way
of conceiving the aims and scope of theoretical physics.14
To be sure, the problem was not to be solved, or dissolved, in the following decades.
In 1972 Dirac wrote ([26], p. 11):
The only theory which we can formulate at the present is a non-local one, and of
course one is not satisfied with such a theory. I think one ought to say that the
problem of reconciling quantum theory and relativity is not solved.
A quarter of a century later, in the 1999 edition of d’Espagnat’s influential treatise,
one can read words to the same effect: “[...] relativistic quantum physics is still a
subject of controversy among the experts. A complete, self-consistent, and useful set
of axioms in this field has not yet been developed” ([24], p. 27). More generally, it
seems appropriate to point out that the supposed reconciliation of special relativity and
quantum mechanics achieved by Dirac “is only partial, for no one has imagined, let
alone produced a quantum theory of special relativity in which the Planck constant ~
is to appear in the Lorentz transformation”, and this fact should be taken into account
by those who pursue the quantum gravity program [37].
13Here is one relevant passage: “The dependence on the reference system, in relativity theory, of
all readings of scales and clocks may even be compared with the essentially uncontrollable exchange
of momentum or energy between the objects of measurements and all instruments defining the space-
time system of reference, which in quantum theory confronts us with the situation characterized by the
notion of complementarity. In fact this new feature of natural philosophy means a radical revision of
our attitude as regards physical reality, which may be paralleled with the fundamental modifications
of all ideas regarding the absolute character of physical phenomena, brought about by the general
theory of relativity” ([16], p. 702). It is hard to see how the complementarity of mutually incompatible
observables may be considered to have any resemblance with the fact that some physical parameters
have different values in different coordinate systems – in relativity or, for that matter, even in classical
physics. This point was explained lucidly by von Neumann ([71], pp. 325-6). On the difficulty of
making sense of Bohr’s claims about EPR, cf. [8], pp. 155-6.
14For instance in his treatise Jauch deals with the EPR argument without even so much as mentioning
special relativity (“Thus the ‘paradox’ of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [...] merely emphasizes in a
most striking way the essential nonclassical consequences of the quantum-mechanical superposition of
states” – [42], p. 190).
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3 EPR correlations and causality
Immediately after the passage cited above, Heisenberg formulated the standard counter-
argument which has been rehearsed and endorsed ever since by a large majority of
authors (italics added):
However, it is also obvious that this kind of action can never be utilized for the
transmission of signals so that it is not in conflict with the postulates of the theory
of relativity.
Here Heisenberg contends that an action which is “propagated with a velocity greater
than that of light” does not contradict special relativity unless it is a signal. This point
of view assumes that special relativity only requires that light signals be the fastest
signals in every direction, not that the speed of light be the limiting value for the speed
of all causal influences.15
To clarify this distinction, we may say that a signal is a causal chain connecting
a sending and a receiving events, such that the sender decided whether and when to
initiate it, and which information was to be conveyed to the receiver. In short, a signal
is a message sent on purpose, and its content is the sender’s choice. Some authors call
a signal a ‘communication’, but it is preferable to distinguish between these notions,
since we can communicate information the content of which we have not devised, or that
we even ignore. For instance, when we consign a sample of our blood to a laboratory
we are undoubtedly communicating quite a lot of information about ourselves, but it
is information the content of which not only we have not chosen, but is also largely
unknown to us.
In general, a chance event, over which we have no control, or at least not as much
control as is needed to qualify it as a signal, may be nonetheless causally influential
– after all, in commenting the so-called Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox, no one has ever
questioned that the decay of the radioactive atom (a chance event) could be causally
responsible for the death of the imaginary poor creature.
These distinctions are relevant to the EPR argument [31, 14, 69], which in the well-
known version presented by David Bohm ([14], pp. 614ff) can be outlined as follows.
Let us suppose we have a pair of fermions of the same type and with zero total spin
(e.g. an electron-positron pair); the only possibility allowed by quantum mechanics is
that they are particles with spin ±1/2, and the normalized state vector representing
this combined system is of the form:
ψ =
√
2ψ↑ ∧ ψ↓, (1)
where ψ↑ ≡ ψ↑[e3] and ψ↓ ≡ ψ↓[e3] are eigenvectors of S3 (the observable of the x3 -
component of spin) with eigenvalues ±~/2 respectively.16 Up to a phase factor, ψ does
15Heisenberg’s view is followed for instance by Stapp, who, however, correctly distinguishes between
signals and information transfers: “The second apparent conflict with relativity theory is the faster-
than-light transfer of information. But this is no conflict at all. What Einstein forbade was faster-than-
light signals, where a signal means a controlled transfer of information.” ([67], p. 100) On causality
and the special theory of relativity I will come back in §7.
16In (1) and in the following I use the same symbols for the eigenvectors of the ‘same’ observable as
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not depend on the component of spin we want to measure, so that ψ↑ and ψ↓ might as
well be re-defined, for instance, in terms of S1 .
If the two particles are separated and an observer measures S3 on one of them, then
another observer (let us call them Alice and Bob as is customary in the literature on this
topic) would get the opposite value by measuring S3 on the other particle, even when
the particles are so far apart from each other, and the instants of the two measurement
events so close, that the separation of these measurement events is spacelike. Einstein
et al.’s concluded that this circumstance implies that in the second particle the value
of the x3 -spin is an “element of reality”, independently of any choice Alice had made
of measuring whatever observable on the first one. But clearly this means that two
incompatible observables (such as S1 and S3 ) both correspond to elements of reality
associated to the same particle, while the uncertainty principle forbids them to have
both a precise value on the same particle. Thus – so the argument goes – quantum
mechanics is an incomplete theory.
Let us sketch the orthodox response to this charge, with the minimum of details
needed for our discussion (as a reference one can use [69], pp. 194-5). The two entangled
particles have no pure states, but only mixed states, obtained by taking the partial traces
of the statistical operator ρ = ψ ⊗ ψ∗ of the combined system; thus, for instance, the
mixed state of the second particle is:
ρ2 = tr1(ψ ⊗ ψ∗)
= 1
2
tr1((ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑)⊗ (ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↓)− (ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↓)⊗ (ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↑)+
− (ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↑)⊗ (ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↓) + (ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↓)⊗ (ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑))
where tr1 is the first partial trace, and the tensor products are expressed using the
identification End(Ψ ⊗ Ψ) ≡ End(Ψ) ⊗ End(Ψ), Ψ being the space of state functions
for a single particle. Since
tr(ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑) = tr(ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↓) = 1, tr(ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↓) = tr(ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↑) = 0,
it follows that the statistical operator of the second particle is
ρ2 =
1
2
(ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑ + ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↓) =
1
2
I,
where I is the identity endomorphism of Ψ. Therefore the probability that the mea-
surement of S3 on the second particle be ~/2 is pS3(~/2/ρ2) = tr(ρ2Π), where Π is the
orthogonal projector on the first vector of the basis (ψ↑, ψ↓). In this basis
Π ∼
(
1 0
0 0
)
,
thus pS3(~/2/ρ2) = 1/2 = pS3(−~/2/ρ2). Such is the situation before and after any
measurement on the first particle has been performed. This shows – so it is claimed –
applied to the state spaces of the two subsystems: the place occupied by a vector as factor in a tensor
product indicates which state space is meant.
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that nothing has happened in Bob’s laboratory as a consequence of Alice’s experiment
(note that it does not matter whether Alice and Bob’s measurement events have a
timelike, lightlike, or spacelike separation!)17
The reason why this reply is unsatisfactory is that it does not tell the whole story.18
In fact if Alice measures S3 on the first particle and obtains (for instance) −~/2,
then the state of the combined system collapses from [ψ] to [ψ′] where ψ′ := ψ↓ ⊗ ψ↑ ,
and this is a pure state. In particular, the statistical operator of the second particle
becomes
ρ′2 = tr1(ψ
′ ⊗ ψ′∗) = tr1((ψ↓ ⊗ ψ∗↓)⊗ (ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑)) = ψ↑ ⊗ ψ∗↑ = Π,
whence it follows
pS3(~/2/ρ
′
2) = tr(ρ
′
2Π) = tr(Π) = 1,
that is, the probability that the second particle has x3 -spin equal to ~/2 is 1 (as it
must be, since the total spin is zero). In other terms, the mixed state of the second
particle has been changed, with a corresponding, dramatic change in the probability of
measuring a positive x3 -spin. Therefore, the orthodox interpretation can only be held
by assuming that an instantaneous change in the mixed state of the second particle has
occurred simultaneously with the spin measurement on the first particle. This is indeed
a ‘spooky action at distance’ (§2), and is adumbrated in Bohr’s distinction between a
“mechanical disturbance” and “an influence on the very conditions which define the
possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system” ([16], p. 700,
italics in the original).
As a double check, let us now consider what happens if Alice had chosen, instead,
to measure S1 on the first particle (yes, I am assuming that the experimenter can
arbitrarily decide what to measure, cf. [11]). Since
ψ↑[e1] =
1√
2
(ψ↑ + ψ↓), ψ↓[e1] =
1√
2
(−ψ↑ + ψ↓),
it turns out that ψ =
√
2ψ↑[e1] ∧ ψ↓[e1], and also that ρ2 = 12I . However, if measuring
S1 on the first particle gives −~/2, then ρ′′2 = Π′ , where this time Π′ is the orthogonal
projector on the spin-up eigenstate of S1 . Thus by computing as before the matrix
components in the basis (ψ↑, ψ↓) one obtains:
Π′ = ψ↑[e1]⊗ ψ↑[e1]∗ ∼ 1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
.
17“Although the three situations – before the experiment, after the sz experiment, and after the
sx experiment – have different descriptions in terms of states of the positron, they all have the same
statistical operator, and there is no observable difference between them. Thus there is no observable
action at a distance between the experiment on the electron and the distant positron; in particular, it
is not possible to use the EPR experiment to send information faster than light.” ([69], p. 195)
18The following counter-reply may be regarded essentially as a ‘Bohmian’ formalization of the argu-
ment contained in Einstein’s 1948 paper [29].
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Clearly ρ′′2 is completely different from ρ
′
2 . In particular
pS3(~/2/ρ
′′
2) = 1/2 6= 1 = pS3(~/2/ρ′2).
The same conclusion holds, with minor changes in the derivation, also if Alice had found
~/2, or if she had chosen to forfeit her agreement with Bob, and measured nothing at
all.
Thus Alice measuring S1 on the first particle (or measuring nothing) does not effect
a change in the probability of finding a positive spin if afterwards Bob measures S3 on
the second particle; but a change does occur (the probability becoming 0 or 1), if on
the first particle it is S3 that Alice had chosen to measure. Thus Alice’s decision to
measure either S1 or S3 on the first particle does causally affect the mixed state of the
second particle in Bob’s laboratory.
4 Local hidden variables
The question the EPR paper did not ask, although the reader was led to expect that a
positive answer was at least conceivable, was: can quantum mechanics be ‘completed’?
In the context of that paper such a ‘completion’ had to be an hidden-variables theory
in which also quantities corresponding to incompatible observables are given a defi-
nite theoretical, if not operational, meaning; and in emphasizing completeness rather
than empirical accuracy Einstein and his coauthors seeemed to imply that such a the-
ory would have to reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics, perhaps
adding a few other empirical consequences of its own in the bargain.
As is well known, an influential and supposedly definitive, but in fact flawed, gen-
eral negative answer to this program was given by von Neumann in his treatise ([71],
ch. IV). In 1964 John Bell proved his famous inequality, which is violated by quan-
tum mechanics, but not by local hidden variables theories [9]. This gave a workable
quantitative counterpart to the difference between quantum mechanics and this class of
theories, and opened the way to a search for crucial experimental tests.
Bell’s result and the large volume of literature descending from it are best considered
as a refinement and a more manageable formulation of the EPR argument (as suggested
in the very title of Bell’s seminal paper). As to the substance of the question, it was
clearly stated since the beginnings of the debate (§§1-2) that no bona fide local hidden-
variables theory can predict genuine superluminal influences, as distinct from apparently
superluminal correlations stemming from a common cause.
To describe the latter possibility, suppose a two-volume book is divided between
Alice and Bob, with each volume of the same size and identically packed and sealed.
No matter how far away Alice travels before unpacking her parcel, she will know at that
very moment – trivially – also which volume has been given to Bob. But of course no
genuine influence from Alice to Bob is involved, and it is irrelevant who between Alice
or Bob opens the package, or in which time order: the outcome(s) will be necessarily
the same (cf. for a similar example [10], p. 83).
From the previous section it should be clear that the EPR correlations are not
of this kind. At the moment of the splitting of the pair there are no two objective
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‘parcels’ of spin values (one value for each possible direction) traveling with each particle,
respectively: such a view is tantamount to supposing that at the splitting event the
two particles stop being quantum objects. In the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics it is the act of measuring an observable that gives it, unpredictably and
irreversibly, a definite value. After this has been done, measuring again the same
observable produce the same result, so time order is an essential feature of the standard
quantum theory of measurement ([25], p. 36; [14], p. 120).19 I will have to say more on
a proposed solution taking to metaphysical lengths the search for a common cause in
the intersection of the causal pasts of EPR-correlated events (cf. [11], p. 102, and my
remarks in §8 and §10 (b) on backwards causation).
Since any bona fide local hidden-variables theory forbids superluminal influences (cf.
also §10 (a)), it must be empirically nonequivalent to standard quantum mechanics.20
A completely different question, of course, is whether actual experimental realizations
of the EPR setting have so far avoided all loopholes which may weaken their scope and
foundational meaning [74, 75, 2].
5 A ‘practical’ consequence
Just as in the case of Einstein’s imaginary experiment discussed by Heisenberg, the
EPR correlations cannot be used to send a signal, because the very idea of a signal
implies the purposeful nature of its content (§3), which is lacking in the measurement
of a spin component. However, as we have seen, the choice between measuring S1 or
S3 on a particle does affect the probability of finding a positive spin when measuring
S3 on the corresponding particle, although this can be ascertained only after the results
obtained on both particles become available. This is a special case of the “no-signaling”
theorems [35, 34], whose scope, however, should not be overrated. These theorems tell
us that the mere fact that an experiment has been performed on part 1 of a combined
system does not change, by itself, the probability of obtaining any given result on the
separated part 2. However they do not assert that this probability is left unchanged
even after the results obtained on part 1 are taken into account (§3, cf.§10 (a)).
In our setting this translates into the following claims:
1) what is measured on the first particle causally influences the mixed state of the
second one, a causal link which can be established with hindsight, but is not created by
anyone’s later knowledge of the fact;
2) this causal influence lies outside the relevant lightcone in Minkowski space-time.
To be concrete, let us indicate by a sequence of 1 and -1 the results obtained by
Alice and Bob, working in far-apart laboratories, for positive and negative spin on
several particles belonging to EPR pairs. Suppose that Alice chooses to measure S3 .
19Cf. [12, 13] for other relevant quotations. Needless to say, it goes beyond the scope of this paper
to consider modified versions of quantum mechanics which have been put forward to cope with the
paradoxes of the standard measurement theory (e.g. [4]; cf. also [7]).
20The view defended here is very similar to the one supported by Bell, for instance in a famous
interview: “In the analysis it is assumed that free will is genuine, and as a result of that one finds that
the intervention of the experimenter at one point has to have consequences at a remote point, in a way
that influences restricted by the finite velocity of light would not permit.”([23], p. 47, my italics)
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Then on, say, 100 particles a sequence like the following will be generated:
a = (1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1, ...)
while on the second members of the pairs the opposite sequence of measurements of
S3 will turn up to Bob, in case he performed his observations of S3 immediately after
Alice’s experiments in their common time coordinate (which of course is supposed to
be compatible with quantum mechanics):21
b = (−1, 1, 1, 1,−1, 1,−1, ...) = −a.
Of course there is nothing ‘suspicious ’ in Bob’s sequence if taken alone – that is, no
one, being shown that sequence and having no other information, could infer anything
about what Alice did. (This circumstance has misled many authors.) However, if and
when Bob were to receive from Alice a report containing list a, he could infer, with
practical certainty, that also Alice has measured S3 (see next section). True, at least
in the present state of physical knowledge a report containing a cannot be transmitted
from Alice to Bob faster than by light signals. But from this it does not follow that
the EPR correlations cannot be used by Alice to send faster-than-light information to
Bob,22 and also to achieve genuinely “practical purposes”, contrary to what has been
asserted, too hurriedly, by several authors.23
In fact, suppose that Alice and Bob agree on the following bet: if the number of 1’s
in Alice’s sequence is even, Bob gets a certain amount of money, otherwise it is Alice
that wins the same amount. If the complete sequence of measurements takes, say, 60
seconds, it is agreed that Alice will measure S3 at 10 a.m. on her particles, and Bob
at 10 : 1 will measure S3 on his own particles – both times being understood in Alice’s
time coordinate. Let us imagine, to add science-fiction colour to the story, that Alice is
on the Earth and Bob is in a geo-stationary orbit half-way between Earth and Sun; then
Bob will be able to say ‘I won!’ or ‘I lost’, with practical certainty, about three minutes
before any message dispatched at speed c by Alice at the earliest possible time (10:1),
could ever reach him. This is a simple model of a macroscopic, and indeed practical,
effect which would be produced with a time lapse smaller than that needed by light to
cover the distance between cause and effect.
21Remember von Neumann’s quotation in §1, or just think of the (time-dependent) Schro¨dinger’s
equation.
22Here are three instances of claims to the contrary (italics added): “[...] it is not possible to use
the EPR experiment to send information faster than light” ([69], p. 195); “[...] a no-signaling theorem
(i.e., our inability, even in principle, to exploit these long-range influences or correlations to transmit
information)” ([22], p. 178); “Even those who believe, on the basis of violations of Bell inequalities,
that such superluminal influences exist will concede that they are ‘non-signaling’: they cannot be used
to convey information from one location to another. This precludes any direct experimental test for
their existence.” ([36], p. 3)
23Two examples (italics added): “Nevertheless, nonlocality cannot be used by human observers for
practical purposes (impossibility of ‘superluminal signaling’)”([68], p. 9); “ It is worth emphasizing
that non-separability [...] does not imply the possibility of practical faster-than-light communication”
([1], p. 190).
13
6 Practical certainty and Bayes’ theorem
I used the term ‘practical certainty’, and wish to elaborate on it. Clearly if the spin-
measurements by Bob were randomly distributed and independent of whatever had been
found by Alice, the probability of obtaining exactly b would be, simply:
ǫ :=
(
1
2
)100
≈ 7.8 · 10−31,
– an utterly negligible quantity. Suppose that there is an agreement between Alice and
Bob as above. Then, after measuring b, in order to evaluate the probability that Alice
measured a = −b, Bob must examine two mutually exclusive alternatives:
R Alice had measured S3 on her particles at the agreed time;
H Alice had not measured S3 on his particles at the agreed time [for instance she
had not measured anything relevant at all, or perhaps S1 , or S2 ].
Let us assume that Bob’s estimate of Alice’s loyalty is high. This may be translated
into the following priors:
p(R) = 1− η, p(H) = η, with 0 ≤ η << 1.
Also, let A(·) stand for ‘At the agreed time Alice measured S3 and found (·)’, and
similarly for B(·). Let us assume that, in Bob’s opinion, Alice’s technical skills are
optimal; in particular, after Bob’s finding of b for him R becomes equivalent to A(−b).
From Bob’s standpoint:
p(A(−b)/B(b)) = p(R/B(b)) = p(R) = 1− η >> ǫ.
The second equality follows from the fact that whether Alice performed her experiments
or not cannot depend on what Bob did at a later time.
So, after making his own observations, Bob knows also Alice’s observations, with a
probability level identical to Bob’s estimate of Alice’s loyalty. After Bob has received
Alice’s report, he can also test this estimate. In fact, let A˜(·) stand for ‘Alice reported
that she measured S3 and that she found (·)’. Then Bob can make the following
probability assessments:
p(A˜(−b)/H) ≤ ǫ, p(A˜(−b)/A(−b)) = p(A˜(−b)/R) = 1− η.
Now suppose Bob receives from Alice a report containing sequence −b; then by applying
Bayes’ theorem Bob gets:
p(R/A˜(−b)) = p(A˜(−b)/R)p(R)
p(A˜(−b)/R)p(R) + p(A˜(−b)/H)p(H)
≥ (1− η)
2
(1− η)2 + ǫη ≥ 1−
ǫη
(1− η)2 ,
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which, given the smallness of ǫ, would be exceedingly close to 1 even for very pessimistic
priors on Alice’s reliability (say, if η = 0.9, contrary to the above assumption).
The argument can be easily adapted to the case that Alice’s report differs from −b
in a few places, or the case in which Alice measures the spin in a direction slightly
different from that of the x3 -axis.
Notice that the need to introduce priors and conditional probability computations
subsists, even if it is usually left implicit, even in perfectly classical cases where an
ordinary signal is received, since registering and construing it as a signal require that
we make assumptions on its sender’s competence and purpose.
7 Signals and non-standard synchronies
Use of signals for synchronization purposes is found already in the original method,
described in 1900 by Poincare´ ([55], cf. [47], p. 779) and in 1905 by Einstein [27], to
define a common time order among stationary clocks: they both chose light as providing
the most reliable kind of signals to synchronize distant clocks from a fixed position. This
method depends, for its concrete implementation, on a further, supposedly conventional
[41], choice of a function; in the affine case, it is what I called a Reichenbach function
ǫ = ǫ(r) ([47, 49]; cf. [62]). The standard synchronization is obtained by putting
identically ǫ ≡ 1/2.
However, as shown in [47], there are other methods, guaranteed to work by the
postulates of special relativity, which define uniquely the standard synchrony, with no
ambiguity and no need for a further arbitrary choice. This implies that the demise
of standard synchrony in special relativity is a much more serious affair than several
authors have deemed it to be, and in particular would entail metrical anomalies.
Using notation and definitions as in [49], let Φ be the Minkowski structure of space-
time, that is the set of all admissible (global) coordinate systems, which is a P+↑ -orbit,
where P+↑ is the proper orthochronous Poincare´ group. An (inertial) notion of rest is
a family Γ(u) of straightlines parallel to u , where u is a timelike vector. A notion
of rest provides the proper environment in Minkowski space-time where the issue of
synchronizing stationary clocks can be suitably treated.
In [47] I pointed out that the widespread (explicit or implicit) belief that everything
special relativity tells us about time has to do with the properties of light is a serious
misunderstanding of the theory and has misled the debate on conventionalism. In fact
special relativity contains another fundamental constraint on (ideal) clocks, namely the
proper time principle, which gives us essential information on the behaviour of moving
clocks, whatever their motions. This allows us to define simultaneity within a given
inertial notion of rest by carrying around clocks and adopting 1) self-measured slow
transport, or 2) symmetric uniform transport (at any subluminal speed) (and, of course,
possibly other non-optical procedures as well). These methods are in themselves at least
as authoritative in defining distant simultaneity as light signaling, and indeed they are
superior to it, insofar as they select only one out of the infinitely many synchronies which
are compatible with light synchronization. Moreover their soundness is established by
the fact that they give consistent results between themselves. Such consistency is highly
nontrivial. It is the physically nontrivial agreement of these measuring procedures which
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justifies the special place enjoyed by the synchrony they select – that is, the one produced
also by standard light synchronization.
To put the argument in reverse fashion, if one adopts a nonstandard synchrony, then
one finds that clock transport will not even approximate the adopted synchrony: for
example, after transport, no matter how slow in self-measured terms, an irreducible,
gross discrepancy between the time indicated by the transported clock and the station-
ary clock would still be observed. In the case of symmetric uniform transport, adopting
a nonstandard synchrony implies, in general, the inequality of the times needed to a
clock to go to and from a certain stationary place, even if the self-measured speed of
the clock has been constant and equal both ways and the motion has been rectilinear.
In other words, natural consistency requirements would be repealed – ‘natural’ in the
sense that, arguably, they have been taken for granted in the whole development of
physical thought and have come to be associated with the very meaning of the involved
concepts.
As far as the philosophical side of the issue is concerned, it must be admitted that
there is no logical inconsistency in allowing for these metrical anomalies to occur, but,
as discussed at length in [47], there is also no logical inconsistency in decreeing that the
‘distance’ from A to B is different from the ‘distance’ from B to A. And yet no one
(as far as I am aware) has ever defended the view that the symmetry of spatial distance
is a ‘convention’, although in a strictly logical sense this description might apply. (Most
of the philosophical discussion on ‘conventionalism in special relativity’ could be easily
adapted to ‘conventionalism about the properties of distance’.) This suggests that an
usage where the term ‘conventional’ may be applied to any theoretical choice which is
not logically compulsory is far too lax to be methodologically useful or even appropriate
in discussing physical theories.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that in special relativity it is possible, by non-
optical experiments within a given notion of rest, to determine whether or not the
synchrony according to which the clocks have been settled is the standard one. This
surely sets a limit to what can be arbitrarily decided about simultaneity within the
theory. Thus physical theories either considering non-standard synchronizations as em-
pirically indistinguishable from the standard one, or selecting one of them on physical
(or cosmological) grounds (§§9-10), must be considered as genuine alternatives to special
relativity, not special relativity in disguise.
8 Causality reversal
Let us fix notation and definitions for a few basic notions [49]. A resting class in
Minkowski space-time is an element of the orbit space Φ/GN , where GN is the Newton
group, generated by all the spatial rotations and by all space-time translations. If
φ ∈ Φ, the GN -orbit of φ is the set of all coordinate systems in Φ which are at rest
with respect to φ . It is easy to see that two coordinate systems in Φ belong to the
same resting class if and only if they have the same synchrony. It is also easy to see
that the module of the relative 3-velocity between resting classes is uniquely defined, as
16
well as the time difference and the spatial distance between any two events.24
The existence of a superluminal causal influence implies that in a nonempty subset
of resting classes a causality reversal (i.e. effect preceding cause) would be observed.
In fact, suppose that in a coordinate system φ ∈ Φ a superluminal causal influence is
observed, i.e. there are two events p, q such that t(p) < t(q) and p is considered to be
the cause of q , with
δ(p, q) :=
|∆r|
c∆t
> 1, with ∆r = r(q)− r(p),∆t = t(q)− t(p). (2)
Since all other Minkowski time coordinates are of the form:
t′ = α(t− 1
c2
V · r) + k, (3)
with |V| < c, α = (1− β2)−1/2, β = |V|/c, k ∈ R, we have, for any other φ′ ∈ Φ:
sign∆t′ = sign(1− 1
c2
V · ∆r
∆t
).
It follows that all coordinate systems φ′ with a velocity V with respect to φ such that
V ·
(
∆r
c∆t
)
≥ c (4)
will observe either an instantaneous action between p and q (equality), or a causality
reversal (strict inequality). Let us call causality constraint on time order the requirement
that cause must chronologically precede effect in all admissible coordinate systems.25
If we enforce this constraint, the existence of even a single superluminal action rules
out infinitely many resting classes. This is a direct consequence of starting with P↑ (or
P+↑ ) as the structure group of space-time and does not require that the superluminal
process we are discussing be a signal.
On the other hand, inequality (4) shows that there are also infinitely many V ∈
B(0, c) such that if we put:
φ′ ◦ φ−1(x) = Λx, where Λ := ΣSΛ(V),
where Λ(V) is the special Lorentz transformation with velocity V and ΣS =
(
S 0
0T 1
)
with any S ∈ SO(3), then in φ′ that particular superluminal action obeys the causality
constraint; also, there are infinitely many resting classes according to which that action
is instantaneous.
24Often when in the physical literature the term ‘frame’ is used, what is really meant is a resting class;
in other cases, as in the conventionality debate, it is an inertial ‘notion of rest’ which is understood.
25Introducing the causality constraint does not imply endorsement of the “causal theory of time”,
according to which any condition on time order that goes beyond the causality constraint is a matter
of convention. As explained in [47] and here in §34 I do not accept this view (cf. also [48], §3.4).
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Finally, suppose that in φ there are signals having a constant speed c in all direc-
tions, with c = c(1 + ℓ), and ℓ > 0. Then inequality (4) implies that for φ′ to violate
the causality constraint a sufficient and necessary condition is
|V| ≥ c
1 + ℓ
. (5)
Of course ℓ might be small enough for earthly experimenters never to have an oppor-
tunity to exchange information with colleagues moving at so high a (subluminal) speed
satisfying (5). However EPR-type experiments have presented us with speeds far bigger
than c, as we shall see in the next section.
9 Neo-Lorentzian Relativity
If we accept that superluminal influences exist and yet we want to preserve the whole
of Minkowski structure Φ, then we are forced to renounce the causality constraint. At
the other extreme, we can enforce the causality constraint and assume that it holds
for just one synchrony. This means that there is just one physically acceptable resting
class (the ‘universal’, or absolute, one) in Φ, and that in all other resting classes a
non-standard synchrony is the physically correct one. The equations linking any other
admissible coordinate system to a fixed Minkowskian coordinate system having the
absolute synchrony turn out to be ([49], §6.1):
{
r′ = λA(r− tV) + b
t′ =
λt
α
+ b4.
, (6)
where λ > 0, (b, b4) ∈ R4, ATA = I3 + αc2VVT .
H. A. Lorentz never accepted the demise of absolute simultaneity. In his lectures
held at the California Institute of Technology in 1922 and published an year before his
death he said: “My notion of time is so definite that I clearly distinguish in my picture
what is simultaneous and what is not.”26 So this theory has justifiedly come to be
known as ‘neo-Lorentzian’.
Such a restoration of absolute simultaneity in contemporary physics is often de-
fended as compatible with the variant of special relativity obtained by weakening the
requirement of light-speed isotropy into two-way light-speed isotropy. However, in order
for the non-standard light synchronizations to define a consistent time order, one must
make the physical assumption that light is the one-way fastest signal in every direction
in all admissible coordinate systems. This is an important point, which is missed by
those authors who think that retreating to two-way velocity isotropy is an innocuous,
empirically neutral move, needing no one-way assumptions ([47], §3). Moreover, once a
privileged synchrony is found, the very argument that has led many to support the two-
way light isotropy approach, namely, the supposed conventionality of one-way velocities,
breaks down, because it would then be perfectly possible to measure the one-way speed
26[46], p. 221. Incidentally, in his erudite book on the origins of special relativity Miller misquoted
this statement by inserting “cannot” between “clearly” and “distinguish”, which gives it the opposite
meaning; this has not been corrected in the 1998 republication ([53], p. 256).
18
of light, and also to show that it is anisotropic. Finally, neo-Lorentzian relativity dif-
fers from special relativity, among other reasons, because it is a theory with metrical
anomalies (§6).
An attempt has been made to exploit the EPR influences to identify, in a very
preliminary way, the universal resting class. Let us assume that φ′ is a coordinate
system in the absolute (or universal) resting class, and φ a coordinate system in the
Earth’s resting class for a short time span; suppose V is the velocity of φ′ with respect
to φ , and consider a (possibly superluminal) influence with initial and final events p
and q , respectively; we also assume that p chronologically precedes q in both φ and
φ′ . The ratio relative to φ of the transmission rate of this influence to the speed of light
is given by δ ≡ δ(p, q) as in (2), and similarly for δ′ relative to φ′ . If we define
β0 := V · ∆r
c|∆r| ,
then a straightforward computation taking into account that
∆r′ = A(∆r−∆tV), ∆t′ = α(∆t− 1
c2
V ·∆r),
where A is of the same form as in (6) and α as in (3), gives (cf. [63]):
δ′2 = 1 +
(δ2 − 1)(1− β2)
(1− β0δ)2 , (7)
Using the trivial bound |β0| ≤ β(< 1) we obtain the inequality:
δ′ ≥ β + δ
1 + βδ
, (8)
where of course the right-hand side is the classical addition law for speeds in the standard
Lorentz transformation (if we take c = 1).
The maximum speed of influence – let us call it c˜ – in φ′ must satisfy the inequality:
c˜ ≥ cδ′ . If δ > 1 (i.e. the influence is superluminal), then the bigger β is, the
lesser the lower bound on c˜ . Thus measuring δ in an Earth’s laboratory establishes a
relationship between the maximum speed of influence in the universal resting class and
the absolute speed of Earth (this can be compared to an underdetermined Michelson-
Morley experiment – where, that is, neither c nor V are taken for granted on theoretical
or empirical grounds).
An experiment along these lines on photon pairs, using energy-time entanglement,
has been performed in 2008 by Salart et al. [63], between two villages staying 18
kilometers apart, about east and west of Lake Geneva, Switzerland. The authors found
a remarkably superluminal lower bound: δ ≥ 1.85 · 105 . By supposing that |V| is 10
times the mean orbital speed of the Earth VE , we have, from (8):
δ′ ≥ 10
−3 + 1.85 · 105
186
= 994.62... ≈ 103,
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that is, the maximum speed of influence in the universal resting class is bigger than c
by at least three orders of magnitudes.
The authors used an upper bound β of |β0| which fitted better their experimental
setting, and which was smaller than β by a factor 1.3× 10−2 , thus increasing the lower
bound on δ′ ; in fact by exploiting (7) one gets:
δ′ ≥
(
1 +
(δ2 − 1)(1− β2)
(1− βδ)2
)1/2
≥ 5.42 · 104, (9)
or, as these authors write, “the speed of the [quantum] influence would have to exceed
that of light by at least four orders of magnitude” (my italics). In short:
V < 10 · VE =⇒ c˜ > 104c.
These authors’ view is that “a universally privileged frame would not contradict rela-
tivity” and refer to [15] to support this opinion. I have made some criticisms of this
view above, and I shall come back to it more fully in §10 (d).27
In any case, in this experiment a point which deserves to be retained is that, even
in the Earth’s resting class, the speed of the quantum influence has been estimated to
be bigger than the speed of light by several orders of magnitude.
10 Discussion
We have seen that quantum mechanics implies, in the Alice/Bob setting, that Bob can
obtain, with practical certainty, complete information concerning Alice’s results before
any message from her could reach him by conventional means; and this, in turn, implies
that the outcome of Alice’s experiments can causally influence Bob before any light
signal from Alice could be received by him. This contradicts the standard interpretation
of Minkowski’s space-time causal structure. In this section I shall examine a number of
proposals to elude this consequence.
(a) In [6] Ballentine and Jarrett introduced a definition of “relativistic locality” (RC)
which, in the context described above, means that if Alice and Bob’s experiments are at
a spacelike separation, then the probability of any fixed outcome in Bob’s experiment is
independent of the mere circumstance that Alice had performed the experiment agreed
upon (and vice versa). Of course, as we have seen in §3, with this definition quantum
mechanics turns out to be “relativistically local”. But what is the rationale behind this
definition? It is that if RC does not hold, then Alice may send a superluminal signal
to Bob (she can say ‘yes’ or ‘no’, for example, according to a suitable agreement with
Bob) by just performing or abstaining from performing the agreed experiment. So if RC
does not hold, then superluminal signals are possible. But we have already explained
(§8) that special relativity does not simply forbid superluminal signals: the physical
possibility of superluminal information transfer means that the causality structure of
Minkowski space-time is inadequate to account for all actions occurring in the physical
27The question of loopholes in this experiment is discussed in [43, 64].
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world. In his book on quantum mechanics, published eleven years later, Ballentine
refers to [6], but qualifies its conclusion by remarking: “However, it is not clear that
the requirements of special relativity are exhausted by excluding superluminal signals”
([5], p. 610). Indeed.
(b) Another proposal has been advanced, by Costa de Beauregard and others [21, 44],
which is to renounce time orientation, thus enlarging the structure group to the non-
orthochronous Poincare´ group P . The idea is that the detection events p1 by Alice and
p2 by Bob are not causally related in a direct fashion, but through p
∗ , the entangled-
pair generation event. It is easy to see that every spacelike vector can be conceived (in
many ways) as the sum of a past-oriented and a future-oriented timelike vectors, but of
course a plausible p∗ would not be available for any conceivable kind of superluminal
influence. By accepting ‘directionless causation’, either Alice or Bob must influence
p∗ in a past-timelike or past-lightlike way (‘backwards causation’). However, unless
we change our very concept of space-time, we must keep into account that event p∗
occurs just once: p1 may include or not Alice’s choice to measure S3 , but it would
severely strain credulity to claim that this choice was implicit in p∗ ; and, if it is not,
Alice’s backwards causation means that Alice can modify her past – something that
some medieval theologians said even an omnipotent deity could not do. Alternatively
we might accept the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and hold that
by her choice Alice jumps to another possible world.
It seems to me that such a reformation (not just a reformulation) of special relativity
would get rid of superluminal EPR influences only at the cost of changing radically
our concepts of macroscopic agency and of space-time. Whatever the merits of such
proposals, for the relativity theorist these are elegant ways to admit defeat.28
(c) A recent objection to the ‘nonlocality’ story has been advanced by supporters of
the subjective probability (‘Bayesian’) approach to quantum mechanics (or “QBism”,
[32], italics added):
Although each of them [i.e. Alice and Bob] experiences an outcome to their own
measurement, they can experience an outcome to the measurement undertaken by
the other only when they receive the other’s report. Each of them applies quantum
mechanics in the only way it can be applied, to account for the correlations in two
measurement outcomes registered in his or her own individual experience. And
[...] experiences of a single agent are necessarily time-like separated. The issue of
nonlocality simply does not arise.
The italicized statement is incorrect, on at least two counts.
First, Alice’s report might be mistaken or, in our fictional example, biased by her
wish to win the bet: thus the effect of her (incorrect) report on Bob might be the very
opposite than if he had been communicated the true results; but, as we have seen,
Bob can independently be informed in a reliable way as to what the truth is, and after
reception of Alice’s report can test whether Alice has really performed the measurements
28Here is a contrary statement: “Therefore, if we accept that causality is arrowless at the micro level,
the Einstein [at the 1927 Solvay conference] and the EPR correlations not only are understandable,
but are so without conflict with the relativity theory” ([21], p. 252, italics in the original). In fact, as
we have seen, it is not only the microscopic level which is affected by this move.
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involved in the bet.29
Second, while two experiences by the same subject are indeed events lying on a
timelike worldline, this does not mean that it is futile, let alone impossible, for Bob
to infer the time lapse for the events that have caused them and the spatial distance
between them in his and Alice’s resting class. As we have seen, a quantity easily
computed by using these data (cf. (2)) determines whether or not Bob is witnessing an
instance of ‘nonlocality’.30
Of course, this does not mean that there is not a legitimate place for Bayes’ theorem
and subjective probability in quantum mechanics (see §5).
(d) In the case of Alice and Bob’s bet, Alice cannot choose the content of the information
being sent, but then again while signaling requires control over content, this is not
equally necessary for sending information (§3). Since Heisenberg’s analysis of Einstein’s
imaginary experiment (§2), this point has been made with various levels of sophistication
by many authors. For instance in 1993 Bohm and Hiley ([15], pp. 295-6) wrote:
[...] any attempt to send a signal by influencing one of a pair of particles under
EPR correlation will encounter the difficulties arising from the irreducibly par-
ticipatory nature of all quantum processes. If for example we tried to ‘modulate’
the overall wave function so that it could carry a signal in a way similar to what
is done by a radio wave, we would find that the whole pattern of this wave would
be so fragile that its order could change radically in a chaotic and complex way.
As a result no signal could be carried.
So far so good. However, as we have seen (§8), if we wish to maintain the causality
constraint we must rule out a big subset of Minkowskian coordinate systems. How
should we interpret what is observed in one of these ‘discarded’ coordinate systems?
Here is Bohm and Hiley’s answer ([15], p. 297; italics added):
If it turns out that the laboratory frame is not the one in which the connections
are instantaneous, then it might seem at first sight as if the present could affect
the past. But because the effect is only on a space-like surface, it follows that
there will necessarily be a frame in which the nonlocal connections act only be-
tween points that are at the same time in this frame. Briefly, what this means
is that there is always a unique frame in which the nonlocal connections operate
instantaneously. In this frame there is no intrinsic logical difficulty about having
nonlocal connections. The behaviour of these connections in other frames will
then always be obtained by transforming these results from the special frame in
which the connections are instantaneous.
Notice first that this formulation is obviously unsatisfactory: there is no uniqueness
of the “frame” (except in (1+1)-space-time). In fact for every superluminal influence
there will be infinitely many resting classes according to which that influence does not
29Incidentally, it is curious that in applications of Bayesian methods to the ‘construction’ of the
physical world the issue of our priors concerning the moral integrity of colleagues and collaborators is
never mentioned.
30In particular it seems to me that these authors’ appraisal of the “mistake” in the EPR argument,
which supposedly “lies in their taking probability-1 assignments to indicate objective features of the
world and not just firmly held beliefs”, misses the point.
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violate the causality constraint, and also infinitely many in which the nonlocal action is
instantaneous (§8). As to the substance of the claim, the fact that for every superluminal
influence there are resting classes which observe the cause as occurring earlier than (or
simultaneously with) the effect does not imply that there is one, universal, resting class
which obeys the causality constraint on time order for every physical influence. To
assume that such a universal resting class exists is a further postulate, and it poses
the natural problem of determining it experimentally, just as to determine the relative
motion of the Earth and the aether was an open issue at the end of 19th century (§9).
However, the reinstatement of absolute simultaneity must be rated not as a possibility
inherent in special relativity, but as as a rejection of what has been generally considered
to be essential to this theory, namely, the physical equivalence of coordinate systems in
uniform relative motion. In other words, it is a change to a different theory.31
11 Concluding remarks
We have seen that the denial of a basic incompatibility between quantum mechanics and
special relativity, which is argued in this paper with reference to the EPR correlations
(§§3-6), and had been recognized by such different thinkers as Einstein, Dirac, von
Neumann, Bell etc. (§§1-2), has three main sources:
1) failure of distinguishing appropriately between signal, information transfer (com-
munication), causal influence (§3);
2) reliance on a version of quantum mechanics which neglects the role of the projec-
tion postulate or repeals it altogether (§4);
3) too narrow a concept of special relativity, often in alliance with conventionalism
concerning simultaneity (§§7-10).
Looking back at the origins of the relativity revolution, it is interesting to note that
the main reason given at the Saint-Louis conference of 24 September 1904 by Poincare´
for hesitating at a full endorsement of the principle of relativity was that celestial
mechanics had suggested that the speed of the gravitational interaction exceeded that
of light by at least six orders of magnitude ([56], p. 312, [57], p. 134; cit. in [47],
pp.779-80).
A few months later Poincare´ changed his mind, if tentatively, when he discovered
what, in our terms, are the first Poincare´-invariant formulations of gravitation. He
announced and, respectively, described in detail these findings (among many others)
in his two famous articles of 1905 and 1906 [58, 59]. Historians of physics have often
31This is how Selleri, after fifteen years of work on nonstandard synchronizations in relativity, put
it in one of his last articles on the topic: “The roots of the causal paradoxes are thus seen to lie in
a much too symmetrical treatment of all inertial systems. In other words, in the 20th century people
have believed too much in the principle of relativity.” Notice that Selleri was inclined to think that the
EPR paradox was to be solved by accepting “the lack of applicability of ‘entangled’ state vectors to
correlated quantum systems”, that is by recognizing (also) “a failure of quantum mechanics”. In the
same paper he stated, however: “In all cases EPR paradox has clearly nothing to do with superluminal
propagations”, which is surely not enlightening ([66], pp. 458, 462; italics added). Popper’s discussion
in the 1982 preface to [61] is still worth reading (although it also contains several questionable points,
even about the history of the problem), in particular his claim that an experiment showing nonlocality
would be “a crucial experiment between Lorentz’s theory and special relativity theory” [p. 30].
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taxed Poincare´ with not being bold enough to espouse the new theory of relativity
in the trenchant way adopted a few weeks later by a young patent office clerk, who
nonchalantly disposed of the aether as “superfluous”.32
At an historical distance of more than a century Poincare´’s hesitancy is worth our
admiration for its methodological wisdom. Surely, it is ironic that the incompleteness
charge against quantum mechanics, levelled by Einstein and co-authors (and supported
by other eminent physicists) on the grounds of loyalty to relativity (“locality”), may
have been overturned after about half a century into an incompleteness charge against
relativity, as lacking an absolute synchrony – a ‘failing’ which had in fact been considered
for so long as one of the most distinctive novelties (if not the most distinctive one) of
the theory. It is true that signals faster than light have not been found yet, still the
foundational scope of light-signaling as internally defining causality-compatible time
orders within different resting classes may have to be renounced. In this case a new
theory will have to take the place of special relativity as commonly understood.
Experiments embodying the logic of the EPR argument have so far been faulted,
to a variable extent, with implicit or explicit assumptions weakening their conclusions.
There is nothing strange with this situation when an experiment is dealing with a
physical issue at such a fundamental level. After all, the loopholes of the Michelson-
Morley experiment and its sequels have been a matter of serious debate within the
physics community for several decades (cf. for instance [52]), and the importance of the
EPR-type experiments is comparable.
At present it is safe to expect that the logical conflict between quantum mechanics
and special relativity, which was so clearly and early perceived by Einstein and so much
concerned him (with good reason, as we have seen), will increasingly be recognized as
an established fact of theoretical physics. It is a very different question whether and
how a particularly clever EPR-type experiment will eventually be accepted by a large
majority of the physical community as an experimental falsification of special relativity.
However, this would not mean necessarily that quantum mechanics would come up
as the ‘winner’, unless the controversies on its interpretation happened to be resolved
satisfactorily. Here is a further interesting analogy with the aether-wind experiments.
When in 1881 Michelson performed at Potsdam the first version [51] of what will become
the Michelson-Morley experiment, he believed he had confirmed Stokes’ theory of the
aether against Fresnel’s. However, Lorentz’s 1886 statement that Stokes’ theory was
untenable for theoretical reasons [45] radically changed the common perception of that
experiment. The resolution of the crisis was ultimately provided by a theory – special
relativity – which, while mirroring some aspects of both theories, was radically different
from each. As suggested by some authors, something similar may well be the fate of
the theoretical conflict discussed in this paper.
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